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Alan Watson*

The Future of the
Common Law Tradition

I. Introduction
The majority of Western systems of private law is habitually
divided by scholars into civil law systems and common law
systems. Eastern Canada fortunately partakes of both traditions the civil law in Quebec and common law in the other provinces.
One difference between the two traditions is the greater and earlier
emphasis that was placed on the teaching of civil law in universities.
In conformity to this, Quebec had three university law schools
before the common law provinces had any; they were McGill
(established in 1848), Laval (established in 1854), and Laval in
Montreal (in 1878). But Dalhousie was the first of the common law
schools, a fact that makes me especially pleased to be involved in
these celebrations.
Many reasons make me particularly proud to be invited to give
this speech. I am a Scot in New Scotland. Edinburgh University,
where I was the Professor of Civil Law from 1968 to 1979, provided
the model for Dalhousie University. When I became a law student at
Glasgow University in 1954, 1 found the situation so delicately
etched for times at Dalhousie by John Willis in his History of
DalhousieLaw School' of one full-time professor, the others being
practitioners. Memories flooded in when I read that splendid book,
and I remembered the student frustration, so gently hinted at, and
the devotion of so many hard-pressed practising teachers. Last, but
surely not least, here I am at a time when the Premier of Nova
Scotia is a member of my own clan.
In a recent book, The Making of the Civil Law, 2 I argued that the
same legal elements - including Roman law, Germanic customs,
cannon law, and feudal law - had permeated the two main strands
of the Western legal world, namely, the common law and civil law
systems. The factor that accounts for the well-known distinctions
between the two types of systems is that civil law systems, unlike
the common law systems, accepted Justinian's Corpus Juris Civilis
*Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania.
1. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979).
2. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981).
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as the organizing instrument. In short, the legal tradition itself plays
an enormous role in legal development. 3 The civil law systems
share much substantive law, much of which comes directly or
indirectly (as a result of later elaboration) from Roman law. 4 But
what is more significant is a shared tradition of ways of looking at
law, including the parameters of solutions, the divisions of the law,
the systematics, the structure (as well as codes), and the sources of
law.
A common organizing instrument is not essential for a shared
legal tradition; it merely enables the similarities to be more easily
recognized and, hence, the role of factors of change to be more
readily identified. When we turn from civil law systems to common
law systems, we are presented with a rather different problem for
understanding the particular tradition and what is inherent in it. This
is so, first, because the common law has no organizing instrument
akin to the Corpus Juris. Second, England was for so long the sole
5
representative of the system to have survived until the present day.
And third, the other modern instances have their roots in English
law.
We are not directly concerned here with the early period before
the establishment of English colonies in North America. But one
point, which was decisive for the future, should be mentioned. A
system that treats law as resting primarily on custom will give
particular prominence to judicial decisions. This is true whether a
decision or a line of decisions is, or comes to be, treated as binding
precedent or not. The reason is that, in practice, the local custom is
often hard to find, customary law is difficult to determine, 6 and
court cases usually constitute the best evidence of customary law,
no matter what procedure is followed in the court for discovering

3. See also A. Watson, Legal Change: Sources of Law and Legal Culture (1983)
131 University of Pennsylvania Law Review. pp. 1126 ff.
4. Much of the shared substantive law is also to be found in the common law. In
large part, this is the result of the same phenomenon, borrowing directly or
indirectly from Roman law.
5. I use this formulation because for a long time English law was not the only
Western system that failed to use the Corpus Juris Civilis as an organizing
instrument. Much could be learned with regard to the impact of the legal tradition
- as distinct from local political, social, and economic factors - on law in
England from a study of Scots law until around 1660, of law in Northern France
until as late as the French Revolution, and of law in Germany until, say, 1495.
6. For illustrations of these difficulties, see Watson, Sources of Law; Legal
Change andAmbiguity (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1984.)
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the custom. 7 The role of judges, whether as law finders or
lawmakers, becomes central, 8 and the time comes when they regard
themselves, and are regarded by practitioners and text writers, as
guardians of the law, the keepers of the law from time immemorial.
(There is an exaggeration here, of course. Often custom is recent;
for example, the Gloss suggests that ten years is enough. But the
exaggeration is not mine. Contemporaries who were responsible for
writing down customary law often stress its age. "This law is
brought to us from antiquity by our forefathers," wrote the author
of the rhyming prologue to the Sachsenspiegalin the early thirteenth
century, and in 1613 the Maitre-Echevin of the town of Metz wrote
of collecting the customs to be found in the judgments, memorials,
and instructions "which mossy antiquity left in the strong boxes of
the town.") In these circumstances, judges, practitioners, and
jurists will regard statute law as an intrusion, and they will resent it
and interpret it narrowly. Both Coke and Blackstone 9 complain
bitterly of the mess made of English common law by legislation,
and a century and a half later Roscoe Pound wrote of "the
indifference, if not contempt, with which that output [of legislation]
is regarded by courts and lawyers."' 1 Pound also stated that the
orthodox common law attitude toward legislative innovation in his
day was that the courts "might not only refuse to reason from it by
analogy and apply it directly only, but also give to it a strict and
narrow interpretation, holding itdown rigidly to those cases which
it covers expressly."" Hostility to statute still emerges occasionally, but in general that attitude is a thing of the past.
What the common law systems share - and for our purposes we
will look at those in Canada, the United States, and England - is
first a set of legal rules and a system of law that was developed
primarily by judges who had this deep suspicion of legislation.
7. Actually, I would go further, though such theoretical elaboration is not needed
here, and claim that customary behavior only becomes customary law when it is
expressed in the proper institutionalized form, namely, in judicial decision; see An
Approach to Customary Law, to appear in Illinois Law Review (Symposium on
Legal History).
8. As systems come under the sway of Roman law, this role of judges changes,
and its previous importance becomes obscured with the rise in prestige of academic
jurists.
9. Commentaries on the Laws of England I (first edition, 1765), pp. 1Of.
10. Common Law and Legislation (1908) 21 Harvard Law Review, pp. 383 ff. at
p. 383.
11. Supra, note 10 at p. 385.
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Imposed upon that are legal systematics which were borrowed in
large part from the civil law. 12 Finally, the common law systems
share an overwhelming amount of statute law (which includes
subordinate legislation and administrative regulation). To a
considerable extent, these three common elements each occurred at
distinct times, although they did not occur simultaneously in all of
the jurisdictions: the set of legal rules and the system of law were
transplanted from England to her colonies; the systematization
occurred largely after the Declaration of Independence; and the
enormous proliferation of statutes is a twentieth century phenomenon. (It should be understood in what follows that I use the term
''common law systems" not to designate case law, but to set off, in
contrast to "civil law systems", that group of legal systems that are
commonly so called, whatever their sources of law.)
It is not the use of the same sources of law - in this case, statute
law and precedent - that leads to the development of the same legal
tradition or the same continuing tradition. Rather, it is the result of
the systems approaching the sources in the same way, of legal
education being approached from the same basic set of values, and
of the legal elite - those persons capable of having an impact on
legal change - sharing the same presuppositions about law and the
same legal values in their different territories. Here one must point
to some vital differences between the three countries under
discussion. First, England differs from Canada and the United
States in not having a written constitution. The existence of a
written constitution not only provides checks on the bodies that
make law, but it also informs attitudes toward law. The power to
declare legislation unconstitutional elevates the stature of the
Supreme Court and inculcates a critical spirit toward legislatures.
The notion of constitutionality, above all else in the United States,
invades whole areas of the law that seem to one from England to be
remote from such a concern. Marriage law is an example. For
instance, can one impose one set of requirements for the validity of
12. See above all, A.W.B. Simpson, Innovation in Nineteenth Century Contract
Law (1975) 91 Law Quarterly Review, pp. 247 ff. But the systematization under
civilian influence was occurring long before this time; see Blackstone's
Commentaries on the Laws of England, which, although first published during the
period from 1765 to 1769, was by no means free of it. The same applies to several
prior works; for discussion of this, see A. Watson, "Justinian's Institutes and Some
English Counterparts", in P. Stein, ed., Essays on Justinian's "Institutes" in
Memory of J.A.C. Thomas, (London: Butterworths, 1983) pp. 181 ff. at p. 185.
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marriage, such as a minimum age, parental consent, and forbidden
degrees of relationship, on one racial or religious group and a
different set of requirements on another? Can one allow one group,
but not another, to practise polygamy? In England, the subject
called "constitutional law" is not only relatively unimportant; it is
also greatly restricted in scope. The new Charter of Rights opens
new and exciting vistas in Canada. The attitudes and the work of
judges of the House of Lords are different from those of the Justices
of the United States Supreme Court, and those of the judges of
Canada's Supreme Court lie somewhere inbetween the two, since
that court deals with both constitutional and nonconstitutional
issues.
A further important difference between England, on the one
hand, and Canada and the United States, on the other, is that the
former does not comprise a federation. This means not only that
Canada and the United States have a plurality of provincial and state
jurisdictions that imparts a vitality of insights into the possibilities
of law reform, 13 but that they also have separate systems of federal
and provincial or state courts with largely different concerns. But
Canada and the United States also differ, in that, as a matter of
course in Canada, the provincial courts exercise jurisdiction in cases
involving federal law, 1 4 and the federal courts are, relative to those
in the United States, much less significant. The different approaches
in the two constitutions to the relationship between federal and state
or provincial power also has an impact on both legislation and
judging.
A little more on these, matters must be said about England in
relation to continental Europe. In 1951, the United Kingdom
ratified the European Convention on Human Rights, and as a result,
the United Kingdom may be judged before the European Court of
Human Rights in Strasbourg. Thus, British legislation, court
decisions, and executive action may be determined to be contrary to
the Convention. Therefore, there is, in a peculiar sense, a Bill of
Rights in England. But the court that can rule on the legality of
13. The term "reform" is used not to suggest that any change is necessarily
beneficial, but that it is thought to be beneficial by those proposing it. England can,
of course, take account of other common law insights. But there is a different feel

to taking note of what happens elsewhere in a federal nation from taking note of
what happens in a foreign country.
14. See, for example, B. Laskin, The British Tradition in CanadianLaw (Hamlyn

Lectures, 21st series, London: Stevens, 1969) pp. 112ff.
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legislation and on other related matters is not an English court. The
House of Lords can declare no act unconstitutional; hence, the
English courts are unaffected in their attitude toward the legislation
of the United Kingdom Parliament. The European Convention on
Human Rights, it should be noted, is not incorporated into English
law. Furthermore, when the United Kingdom joined the European
Common Market in 1973, all the appropriate European Community
law, which was concerned mainly with economic affairs,
automatically became part of the law of England. Hence, England is
part of a federation. But I confess that, in matters of domestic law, I
see no fresh impact of European legal attitudes on English judges or
academics.
There is a further significant difference between England's
approach to the sources of law, on one hand, and that of the United
States and Canada, on the other. The former takes a very strict
approach to the binding nature of precedent. The House of Lord's
practice statement of 1966,15 in which it was announced that it
would no longer regard itself as being bound by its own previous
decisions, does not apply to the Court of Appeal, which is still
bound by its own precedents. And the House of Lords only rarely
16
makes use of its power to overturn its previous decisions.
In legal teaching, the emphasis is much more practical in the
United States than it is in England, both with regard to the subject
matter of the courses and to the approach, which involves detailed
study of a small number of cases, rather than a systematic
exposition of a branch of the law. 17 An American leaves law school
with a perspective different from that of his English counterpart. He
is much more problem-oriented, much less willing to take legal
rules on trust, and much readier to distinguish cases. By contrast,
the new Canadian lawyer seems to me to be very similar to his
American counterpart. Still, one factor provides some cohesion
between the common law systems, namely, the movement of
academics from one jurisdiction to another, in the process of which
they take their particular expertise with them and share their

15. [1966] 1 W.L.R. 1234.
16. See, for example, A. Paterson, The Law Lords (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1982), pp. 162ff.
17. 1 am talking here only of teaching and not of published scholarship. The
concerns of American and English scholars are often different, but the writings of
American professors are at least as theoretical.
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approaches with their new colleagues and students. Very recently,
for instance, G.H. Treitel, A.W.B. Simpson, S.F.C. Milson, and
G.H. Jones spent at least a semester teaching in the United States,
while P.B. Caner spent some time teaching in Canada and G.
Calabresi and J.O. Honnold were in England. There seems to be
rather less movement of senior academics between Canada and
other countries, but this is made up for by the relatively high
proportion of Canadian law professors who have studied in another
common law country.
Overall, it seems that the legal traditions in Canada, the United
States, and England share few common features. But perhaps the
similarity is not so weak as one might be inclined to think. One very
significant detail must not be overlooked. In private law, at least, it
is, as I have said, perfectly feasible for a professor from one
common law jurisdiction to go to another for a semester and teach a
perfectly respectable course in the current local law. Some extra
work will be necessary of course. However, a professor from a civil
law country would have a (virtually) impossible job teaching the
local law of a common law country, even in his or her own field of
specialization; the vocabulary, the constructs, the underlying
assumptions, the procedure, and even the relationship between
procedure and substantive law would all be new.
Of course, political, social, and economic factors also account for
changes in law, particularly in its substance. These factors will not
be insisted upon here, not because they are unimportant (though
they can be overstressed). But they differ greatly at times from one
province to another while those in one common law province or
state may have considerable similarities with those of a civil law
jurisdiction.
What, then, can one say about the common law tradition as it will
develop in the relatively near future? (I write from the long-term
perspective of one who, for several years, did not venture for his
scholarship into the Christian era and whose work kept taking him
further back.) Projection into the future is much more difficult than,
with the aid of hindsight, explaining the natural evolution of the
past. Yet, the comparative legal historian does have some tools at
his disposal. He can look at what has happened, not just once but
regularly, in the past, and can talk about the lessons of history.
What is being suggested, of course, is not that what has regularly
happened in the past will always occur in the future. Rather, in the
absence of new and unforeseen circumstances (which can always
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occur), what has been the tendency to occur in the past will have the
tendency to occur in the future. In terms of the future development
of the common law systems, three facts seem certain and decisive.
In the first place, there has been, as a matter of observable fact, a
great shift in the balance of lawmaking in the common law world
from judicial precedent to legislation, which together comprise the
two main sources of law.' 8 In the second place, there is a deep
awareness in the common law countries of a crisis in lawmaking, an
awareness that is probably stronger and more widely shared among
the elite of lawyers than at any other time in the history of the
common law. In the third place, and consequently, the future of the
common law will depend above all on what, if anything, is done to
resolve this crisis in the sources of law.
For the future of the common law as a group of systems sharing
the same traditions, a lesson to be drawn from the history of these
systems is that the rules of substantive law that are accepted are of
less importance than the attitude taken toward, and the relative
importance of, the sources of law. It is possible, or even probable,
that nothing drastic will be done to reform the sources of law. A
further lesson of history is precisely that grave deficiencies in the
sources of law which impede certainty and clarity in the law and
hinder its capacity to meet glaring social needs can go unchanged
for centuries, even when the deficiencies are well known to those
persons in command of lawmaking. 19 (As I write the first draft of
this paper, I recall that it was only yesterday evening at dinner that a
distinguished American judge remarked that Calabresi had got it
wrong! The saving grace of law was precisely that the legislature
did not intervene more often with changes in the law; doing nothing
was what it did best. The remark, I believe, should not be construed
as indicating satisfaction with the present state of the law and how it
is created, but rather fatalism at the idea of reforming Congress and
the Senate. The judge should know: he was a legislator.) Yet, I
think this time some reform is likely in the (relatively) near, but not
foreseeable, future. In 1981, after centuries of authoritative
discontent, the Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain, Lord
Hailsham of Marylebone, claimed that "Parliament in general and

18. 1 am

including

subordinate

legislation

of all

kinds

within

the term

"legislation".
19. See Watson, Sources of Law, supra, note 6, and Legal Change, supra, Note 3.
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the House of Commons in particular has long since ceased to
20
believe that its main business is to act as an efficient legislature".
In 1983, the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court,
Warren E. Burger, characterized the situation by saying: "But I
suggest the analogy of the early pioneer who, looking out the
window of his log cabin, saw a pack of wolves destroying his
livestock, killing his chickens and clawing at his smokehouse with
its supply of food. Someone in that situation need not be apologetic
about calling for help - if there is anyone within hearing who can
help - as you who are within hearing can help". 21 And in 1982, a
leading academic, Guido Calabresi, devoted a book to the dilemma
facing the courts, namely, that of statutes that do not fit the legal
landscape, and to the "lack of current legislative support." In the
book, Calabresi analyzed suggested solutions and proposed his
own. When things such as these occur, then we may hope that
sooner or later one common law system will opt for reforming the
sources. Then the other systems, one by one, may follow at their
own pace. This, at any rate, has been the experience in civil law
systems with codification. The reasons are complex, but unifying:
the need for drastic reform has long been felt; the systems are, in
fact, ripe for an overhaul; and the example of one system
concentrates the attention of the other on the defects of the existing
structure of lawmaking, and inculcates the spirit of competitive
progressiveness and reminds the lawmakers of the need to appear
concerned about the public good.
I will approach the issue of what the future will be in four stages,
as follows:
1. What are the advantages and disadvantages of these
individual sources of law when they are working as well as
can reasonably be imagined in an age of statutes?
2. What are the advantages and disadvantages of these
individual sources as they typically work in the common law
world in which we live?
20. "Obstacles to Law Reform", in Current Legal Problems (1981), pp. 279 ff. at
p. 286 (34). For other authoritative expressions of the ineffectiveness of Parliament
as a legislature, see Watson, Sources of Law, supra, note 6.
21. Justice Burger was adverting to the danger that, after sixteen years of exposing
the vast overloading of the Supreme Court, he might be regarded as "crying wolf";
see Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary, New Orleans, Louisiana, February
6, 1983, p. 1. He also stated that by now a clear majority of the court had spoken on
the issue and that they "are essentially of one mind: that there is indeed a very
grave problem and that something must be done"; see p. 9.
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3.

When these sources of law are working as well as can
reasonably be imagined, what would the best combination of
them be and what should their respective spheres be,
accepting always that, for our purposes, they are conceived
of as working in a representative democracy?
4. How fundamental are the solutions to the problems with the
sources which are likely to emerge?
Statute law, as it may be imagined at its best in the best possible
world dominated by statute law, will systematically set out the rules
of a whole branch of law in a way that is comprehensive in dealing
with broad issues and is reasonably comprehensible. The rules will
give the people affected by them what they want and need as that is
determined by the dominant theory in the society (although at times
statute will also have an educational function). The rules in the
statutes will change with the serious needs and desires of the people
affected, but will not be subject to perpetual motion as the result of
every sudden change of opinion. 22 Stability in law is an obvious
virtue, as is the law's responsiveness to social needs.
But what statute cannot do, as has been recognized by the best
legislators, 23 is foresee every situation that will arise in practice,
make clear provision for every eventuality, and leave no gaps in the
law. Two different types of situations will occur which will give rise
to dispute regarding the legal rules and which will, if the parties
involved press their claims, eventually come before a court: the first
is those cases where the statute is not wholly unambiguous and the
legal answer has to be sought for, and the second is those cases
where the statute simply provides no answer. In at least the second
situation, if the court's decision is taken as being authoritative in
other similar cases, then the judge is a lawmaker.
Again, in the best possible world judicial precedent will
harmoniously reflect what is generally wanted from the law by those
affected, it will establish clearly the legal rule which is regarded as
being exemplified by the decision, it will pave the way for the
constructive development of the law in subsequent cases, and it will
be educative for the legislature in that it will indicate trends. But
more cannot be demanded from judges than they can reasonably
22. In a fully worked out program, phrases like "serious needs and desires" would
require definition.
23. See, above all, Portalis, Tronchet, Bigot-Pr~ameneu, and Maleville, in
Discours pr~iiminaire du premier projet in the anonymous Conference du Code
civil 1 (Paris: Firmin Didot, at XIII = 1805) p. xxvii.
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give. Development by individual precedent cannot be wholly
systematic, since the judge is concerned with the case before him.
He cannot settle the outlines of a whole institution. Again, whole
areas of the law, if left to be settled by precedent, will remain
underdeveloped because no one individual has sufficient incentive
24
to pursue the matter before a high enough tribunal.
Even this short sketch indicates that, as has often been stressed
before, the functions and the arts of the legislature and of the judge
with regard to lawmaking are different: the legislature lays down the
basic framework of the law and the judge fills in the details. 25 This
is not to deny the importance of good judging or even the enormous
significance that an individual decision may have. However, it is
the case that legislation proceeds from the broad premise, and
judicial precedent from detailed facts. There is a further vital aspect
to the different functions and arts. The legislature is not, in theory,
bound by what has gone before. With the stroke of a pen, it can
create an entirely new branch of the law and can change an entire
legal institution; it can also render whole libraries obsolete. 2 6 A
judge does not have the same freedom. He is first bound to establish
what the law is. Only when he finds that there is no law is he free to
go to the next step, accept that there is no law, and hence make law.
Yet even here his freedom is limited. He cannot make his decision
and justify it just as he pleases. Rather, he is bound by the rules of
the game, namely, the tradition of judging. In a very real sense, his
justifications are backward-looking. His main arguments are based
on analogy (with similar rules or with other legal institutions) and
on established authority (within his own system or within another,
which must, in its turn, be regarded as acceptable). Even when he
innovates law expressly on the grounds of social policy, he will feel
bound to explain why appeals to existing analogies or authorities are
not appropriate. These alternatives have to be positively excluded
before his justification can be deemed acceptable.
A glance here at the famous first article of the Swiss Code Civil of
1907 is instructive regarding perceptions of the role of judges:
24. In some circumstances this particular problem may be mitigated by the
existence of class actions.

25. Under a different system, where there is little or no legislation, judging may
also provide the framework. Yet that process takes a long time and a large number
of judges, and systematization is lacking.
26. In practice, the drafters of legislation are bound by their training and
knowledge, as well as by their imaginations.
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Statute regulates all matters to which the letter or the spirit of one
of its provisions apply.
In the absence of an applicable statutory provision, the judge
pronounces according to customary law, and in the absence of a
custom, according to the rules that he would establish if he had to
act as legislator.
He will be inspired by the solutions consecrated by academic
opinion and case law.
The judge, then, may have discretion. He may even be able to
decide by the rules he would establish if he were acting as a
legislator. Yet, he is not given the freedom of legislators here.
Rather, he must take academic opinion and case law as his guide,
both in this case and in interpreting the wording or spirit of statute or
customary law.
It is here, I think, that I detect a weakness in Calabresi's
argument. In proposing that in particular circumstances the court
should be able to nullify or modify statute law, he writes: "The
courts' judgment must be based primarily on whether the statute fits
the legal landscape, because that is what a court is good at
discerning and because 'fit' is correlated with majoritarian
support."12 7 He does admit, though, that the legal landscape and
majoritarian support are far from the same. Of course, the court is
good at discerning the legal landscape. The function of the judge,
and his art, consist of fitting decisions in hard cases into the existing
legal landscape. But statute is different, Calabresi continues: it can
cause an earthquake which drastically changes the legal landscape,
and old though the statute may be, 28 the landscape remains
changed. The statute need not harmonize with the preceding
landscape. The flaw in Calabresi's argument is not so much his
correlation of the legal landscape with majoritarian support 29 - an
assumption that he never attempts to prove - but his claim that as a
result of the correlation a court should base its judgment as to the
27. G. Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes (Cambridge, Mass.:

Harvard University Press, 1982), p. 121.
28. Calabresi is thinking of statutes which have become old.
29. I rather have the impression that Calabresi's choice of terminology specifically, "fit the legal landscape" - causes some imprecision. He cannot
mean that the statute in question is no longer in force because it is inconsistent with
the rules set out in a subsequent statute. He seems to mean, if I read him correctly,
both that the statute could no longer be passed and that it is inconsistent with the
"spirit" of the people.
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validity of the statute on the test of whether it fits the legal
landscape .30
There is a sad divergence from the ideal in the three common law
countries we are considering. In all of them the following three
points are well recognized: statutes remain in force long after they
cease to correspond to what the populace or the leaders need or
want; the law is often contained in a number of statutes, since new
legislation frequently does not expressly abolish the old (which
remains in force insofar as it is not inconsistent with the new
legislation); and legislation is often confused, partly because of poor
draftmanship, partly because of clauses inserted to achieve
compromise, and partly because of alterations that were made as the
bill was passing through the legislature. Such defects in American
legislation are the starting point for Calabresi's appeal for reform,
and English authorities have long been loudly vocal about the
failings in their system. 3 1 With regard to Canada, Samuel
Freedman, once Chief Justice of Manitoba, said when discussing
the difficulties of law reform by the courts that "another line of
thinking says, 'leave it to the legislature.' But action from that
source is an uncertain thing; legislative time is notoriously limited,
and reform, therefore, may not come." 32 What is significant about
this statement is the tone, (for everyone knows reform may not
come from the legislature).
But the courts are not in any better shape. Warren Burger stresses
the overwork of the Supreme Court. I would point to the difficulties
- which in theory, at least, are insurmountable - of finding the
ratio decidendi of a case when, as is usual, the judges do not declare
it. I would also point to the flexibility and frequent injustice caused
by stare decisis. 33 To the extent that stare decisis is not absolute 3 4
and judges do not declare their ratio decidendi, ambiguity and
uncertainty result. The sorry shape of statute and precedent for
lawmaking today, which is not caused by any absence of talent,
need not be insisted on further.
30. See, for example, A.J. Mikva, Review of Calabresi (1982) Harvard Law
Review 96, pp. 534 ff. at p. 540.
31. See those cited by Watson, Supra, note 6.
32. Continuity and Change -a
Task of Reconciliation (1973) University of
British Columbia Law Review 8, pp. 209 ff. at 212.
33. Supra, note 6.
34. See, for example, G.F. Curtis, Stare Decisis at Common Law in Canada
(1978) 12 University of British Columbia Law Review, pp. 1 ff.
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The heart of the issue for good lawmaking in an age of statute and it is also the heart of the question of whether one will be able in
the near future to say that American, Canadian, and English law
belong to the same legal family - lies, I believe, in the relationship
between lawmaking by the legislature and lawmaking by the courts.
This, I believe, was perceived by Calabresi, who wished that the
courts would, in certain circumstances, be able to overrule statutes
even without declaring them unconstitutional. 3 5 This, however, is
to misconceive the relationship between lawmaking by statute and
lawmaking by judicial decision, a relationship which I believe is
inherent in the nature of legislation and precedent. The point and the
art of legislation is to lay down the broad rules of the law
systematically and to establish the social principles that are regarded
as desirable. The point and the art of judicial decision when faced
with a statute - which, in an age of statute law, is most of the time
is to determine the result in a particular, narrowly defined,
factual situation and in accordancewith the statute. The judge must
interpret the statute; in other words, the statute is supreme. It is not
necessary here to raise the issue of whether it is proper for a judge,
who is not popularly elected, to go against the will of the popularly
elected legislature. The supremacy in law of statute over judicial
decision-making remains in a democracy, in an oligarchy, in a
monarchy, and even in a tyranny. 3 6 Even when a court declares a
statute unconstitutional, this relationship between legislature and
court is unaltered; the court is merely declaring that the statute is
inconsistent with higher legislation. In an age of statutes, both
judges and legislators make law, but they do not make it in the same
way or even in the same sense. Specifically, judge-made law is
37
subordinate law.

35. See Calabresi, note 27.
36. This is so in legal theory. But, of course, in practice a judge's decision may be
morally superior to the statute he is supposed to be interpreting, and at times a
judge may be morally bound not to follow a statute.
37. Any other solution invites confusion. For instance, it might be argued that in a
democracy a judge (especially one who is elected) should not follow legislation
which could not be passed in the circumstances prevailing at the time of his
judgment. But even the most recent legislation would then be in question because
the members of the present legislature responsible for the legislation would not all
be re-elected if the election were held on the day of the judgment. Similarly, the
judge could not even rely on previous judgments, not even his own. Indeed, he
should not even have the right of judging unless it were certain he would be
re-elected at the time of judgment. In addition, there is the problem that the judge
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The crux of this issue lies in the phrase "in accordance with the
statute." That phrase can only mean "following the spirit of the
statute," which in turn can only mean "in accordance with the
intention of the legislature." Let us leave aside the practical
difficulty of establishing precisely what the legislature's intention
was. Let us also treat as of limited significance the issue of a factual
situation arising which the legislature just did not foresee. In this
last situation, one can say (if one leaves aside the practical
difficulties) that the judge has to decide in accordance with the
perceived spirit of the statute.
For a judge to interpret a statute rationally, he must follow the
intention of the legislature; any other procedure means that he is
stealing supremacy from the legislation and that he is acting
arbitrarily. Yet, rationality requires that he also achieve a result
which, on balance, is more desirable than any other decision, based
on the consequences it will have for the litigants. 38 Often the judge
just cannot do this, as Calabresi, for instance, is aware. The two
tests for achieving rationality may conflict in practice. It may be
rational to say that to find the intention of the legislature the judge
must primarily study the wording of the statute, but it is not rational
(though it may be reasonable in the circumstances, since the judge
must reach a decision) to say that the wording is to be interpreted
according to a meaning that could reasonably be attached to the
wording today. Such an approach would deny validity to the
intention of the legislator. In the case of old legislation where the
original intention of the legislature is inappropriate today, there is
no way that a judge can interpret the statute rationally.
Theoretically, it is impossible in existing circumstances to construct
a sensible theory of interpretation of statute because one has to say,
first, that the intention of the legislature has to be followed, second,
that this remains true even when the old intention of the legislature
is no longer appropriate, and third, that the decision has to be
appropriate to the current social context.
The impossibility of formulating a satisfactory theory of the
interpretation of statute is very easily demonstrated when we look at

might not be able to determine which solution would command majoritarian
support. The result is the end of law in the sense of definite rules which provide a
standard.
38. See, for example, R.A. Wasserstrom, The Judicial Decision (Stanford:

Stanford University Press, 1961) et. seq.

82 The Dalhousie Law Journal

the attempts of civilians for whom legal theory is much more
important. As a typical example, I have chosen the following
quotation of Francisco Bonet Ram6n, both because of his authority
as a law professor and as judge of the Supreme Court of Spain and
because of his clarity: "Interpretation is the mental operation by
which we grasp the meaning and scope of the rule. According to the
subjective theory, the meaning of the statute equals, no more no
less, the intention of the legislator who sanctioned it. According to
the objective theory, the meaning of the statute is not the intention
of the legislator, but the intention of the statute considered
objectively as a substantive being endorsed with its own strength.
The informing principle is that the social life should not submit to
the result of juridical principles and theory but those principles and
that theory must adapt themselves to the needs of life. Though the
law remains unchanged in its literal expression, the interpretor can
give it a different value, the conditions of the time in which it was
formulated were one thing, and the social interests which determine
it and the needs for which it must provide are another." 3 9 One must
honor and respect those who formulate such a theory in order to
obtain satisfactory results in practice, but one must also believe that
they are forced to create an artificial theory of objective intention
which has no inherent validity. First, a statute is an abstract creation
of the human mind. It does not exist as a sentient being and can have
no intention. Second, the artificiality of the approach is
demonstrated by the argument for it, namely, that "social life
should not submit to. . . juridical principles and theory." It is being
admitted, in other words, that juridical principles and theory do not
point to the correct decision. Third, conditions have changed, but
the words of the statute were chosen deliberately, we presume, to
give effect to the intention of the legislator. If that intention is to be
flouted, why should the interpreter be stuck with the wording of the
statute (expressing the intention) which may, for present conditions,
be obviously and outrageously inappropriate? It is obviously
theoretically absurd that the judge has to give a new meaning to
words, a meaning which the words often cannot bear without
considerable ingenuity and straining of terms. Thus, the rhetorical
question asked above uncovers both the theoretical and the practical

39. Codigj Civil comentado on art. 6 (2nd ed., Madrid: Aguilar, 1964) p. 39.
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reason for the rule that the judge cannot alter the wording of a
statute: if he did, he would cease to be an interpreter for the
individual case and would become a legislator issuing general rules.
The issue is clear. A judge cannot rationally interpret a statute
unless he uncovers and follows the intention of the legislator. That
is a sine qua non of rational interpretation, yet it is not enough. The
decision must also be better for the parties involved than any other
decision. Hence, in an age of statute the starting point of rational
judging must lie in satisfactory statutes.
In practice, too, it is often impossible for a judge to decide a case
rationally. The starting point of radical reform of the common law
systems must lie in a new approach to statute-making that will
ensure that statute law is kept up to date and relatively certain. In
addition to enabling judges to reach decisions rationally, this
scheme should reduce the ambiguity of the law and reduce the case
load of judges.
But in this new world, judges will have another task imposed on
them: they will be expected to set out as an abstract proposition the
rules or principles of law on which they base their decisions. At
present, it is the task of the judges hearing subsequent suits to
determine the ratio decidendi of previous cases. There is, no doubt,
a practical reason for this. It may be felt that a judge deciding a case
which introduces new features cannot determine exactly what rules
or principles ought to be applied in these and in subsequent, as yet
unforeseen, circumstances. The practical fear is reasonable, since a
rigid statement in the instant case of its ratio decidendi may, if
precedents are binding and are treated rigidly, lead to an unfortunate
line of development. However, a solution might be to regard
precedent not as binding, but as highly persuasive, and then to
demand that the decision be set out as a legal rule. This would give
flexibility, yet would provide for greater clarity in the law and, I
40
believe, more certainty.
Technically, it would not be difficult to achieve a radical reform
of the sources of law in an age of statutes, and I have elsewhere set
out my proposals on how this should be done with regard to
Scotland. 4 1 What precisely these are is not important here. Rather,

40. Supra, note 6.

41. Supra, note 6. The proposals would require considerable modification before
they could apply to a federation.
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what matters is that it be recognized that drastic reform, if it is to
come, must begin with the way statute is made and kept up to date.
At the very least, it would be easy, given the existence of
computers, to insist that when legislation is required on any subject,
it cover the whole of that subject, replace all existing legislation,
and be free from all internal inconsistency (even that which may be
introduced during the passage of the bill). If, following on such,
judgments also expressly set out the propositions of law on which
the decisions were based, the law would gain further clarity.
If such radical reform of statute and precedent occurred even in
all of the common law jurisdictions, then the remaining restricted
unity of the common law tradition would be largely ended for three
reasons. First, a large part of what unity there is derives from
history. I do not mean that the legal rules are the same in the various
jurisdictions. Rather, many of the rules have a common origin
which still influences the understanding of them, even if they have
come to diverge from one another in the different jurisdictions.
Second, in the different jurisdictions it was claimed that the legal
tradition itself is of great importance for developing the law. Yet, of
the forms of lawmaking in the Western world, it is legislation that is
the most radical and the least dependent on the tradition.
Furthermore, if all legislation is treated as a new beginning in its
field, there is no reason, within the tradition, why the law of Nova
Scotia would remain closer to that of England and more distant
from, say, that of France. Similarities will persist, of course,
because of shared social, economic, and political circumstances;
nevertheless, there is no reason why the law of Nova Scotia might
not come to approximate that of Norway, rather than that of
Pennsylvania. 42 Third, there is the fact of the existence of a written
constitution in the United States and Canada, and the absence of one
in England. Since supremacy of statute for lawmaking does not
establish a shared tradition, differences in approach to legislation
and judicial decision-making become decisive.
But codification, which was a drastic reform of the sources of law
in the civil law systems, did not end the shared tradition in those
systems. Justinian's Corpus Juris Civilis was the organizing
instrument before codification; once codification was introduced,

42. Another reason for having similar rules
commercial and industrial matters.

is cooperation,

especially

in
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the universal model, either directly or indirectly, was Justinian's
Institutes (with the sole exception of the Allegemeines Landrechtfiir
die Preussischen Staaten (1794). Hence, the shared tradition
continued after codification, but on a different basis. It might be
suggested that drastic reform of the sources of law in the common
law systems would not end the unity. This may be so, but I am
doubtful. One of the fundamental differences between civil law and
common law systems is precisely that the latter have no shared
organizing instrument, although they do have common historical
roots. Only if the restructured law of the first common law system to
engage in drastic reform of the sources was itself to become the
organizing instrument would there be the possibility of a continuing
shared tradition.
I think that we should not be so pessimistic about the demise of
the shared common law tradition. For satisfactory lawmaking in the
common law systems, drastic reform of the sources of law is
needed, a reform that will also end the shared common law
tradition. Reform will come, but I am almost sure that it will not be
drastic. Law exists and flourishes not only in the practical world,
but also at the level of ideas, as part of culture. On the cultural level,
it operates on the population at large, on lawyers in general, and on
the lawmakers. As culture, it impinges most directly on the
lawmaker and, moreover, legal change must be mediated through
the culture of the lawmakers. But the more that something is part of
a culture, the more resistant it is to change and the more hostile the
reaction of the members of the group will be to suggestions of
change. Finally, the means for creating law are more deeply
embedded in the culture than are the individual rules. 4 3 In
particular, a change of the kind I have suggested would require of
legislators that they give up some of the power they currently have
to make laws just as they please and it would rob the judges of some
of their role as creators of law. It is significant that neither Burger
nor Calabresi, in stressing the need for reform, urge the need to
reform the practice of Congress; nor does Hailsham produce a plan
for the practical reform of the British Parliament. There is also no
strong drive among legislators for reform. The last lesson of history
that will be offered in this paper is that usually only someone who is
largely outside of the culture can push aside its impact on himself

43. See Watson, supra, note 3, pp. 1156.
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and be free from the pressures of his legal peer group to the extent
needed for drastic reform. Indeed, reform of the sources of law is
usually a sideline, almost a by-product of the person's enormous
energy and drive: to wit, the efforts for the reform of codification
practices made by Lipit-Ishtar, Hammurabi, Moses, Justinian,
Alfonso X, Frederick the Great, Napoleon, and Ataturk. The
political systems of Canada, the United States, and England, as they
presently exist, do not give scope to such a person.

